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Complementarity and Human Rights:




In spite of the establishment of the International Criminal
Court (ICC or the Court), national criminal jurisdictions remain
the principal actors expected to realize the basic aims of
international criminal justice as articulated in the preamble of the
Rome Statute (the Statute).' The basic aim is to put an end to
impunity for the perpetration of "grave crimes," or "the most
serious crimes of concern for the international community as a
whole," and thus, contribute to the prevention of such crime, as
well as guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of
international justice In fact, the Statute reinforces a central role of
national criminal justice institutions in that it does not merely
reiterate a general competence of states to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over such crimes, but stipulates that it is a duty of
states to do so.' The drafters of the Statute took care to emphasize
Research Fellow, Center for Political and Constitutional Studies, Madrid.
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. The Statute entered into force on July 1,
2002. As of February 8, 2007, one hundred and five states are parties to the Statute. Forty-
one states have signed, but not ratified the Statute.
2. See id. at pmbl, art. 5(1).
3. See id. 1 6. For a comprehensive account of the specific international legal
foundations of this duty, see CHERIF B. BASSIOUNI, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE
DUTY To EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995). Yet, note that
the draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission vol. II (Part Two) (1994), does not recognize a general duty of states to
exercise criminal jurisdiction, but instead only refers to the principle aut dedere aut
judicare. U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, [1994]
2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 65, art. 54, U.N. Doc. A/49/10.
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the central role of national criminal jurisdictions in ensuring that
massive crimes do not go unpunished and they recognized a
general legal basis for this assertion. Nevertheless, little attention
was paid to the question of what states4 must and must not do in
order to fulfill this duty.' This article discusses the insufficient
attention that has been afforded to the issue of human rights
standards. In particular, more attention is owed to the very
relevant question of how human rights standards should inform or
constrain national efforts to bring the perpetrators of the most
serious crimes to justice, and the role of the Court in relation to
these standards.6
4. For the purpose of the article, unless otherwise indicated, the term "state" refers
to "state parties" to the Rome Statute. The main focus is on the duty of states on whose
territories massive crimes have been committed. Thus, it does not contemplate the duty of
so-called extraterritorial states, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, and its appropriate
application. It does, however, consider the duty of non-state parties since such states can
become directly affected by ICC decisions as a result of a Security Council referral. Rome
Statute, supra note 1, at art. 13(b).
5. Until now, the legal debate has centered, for the most part, on whether states are
obliged to revise their criminal codes and incorporate the crimes included in the Statute
(e.g., genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity). See, e.g., Jann Kleffner, The
Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive International
Criminal Law, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 86 (2003); Goran Sluiter, Implementation of the
ICC Statute in the Dutch Legal Order, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 158 (2004).
6. The state of affairs is reminiscent of a general tendency in the field of
international criminal justice devoted to the suppression and punishment of grave or
serious crime. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, S. Treaty Doc. No. 81-15, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (failing to make any
mention of the need to protect the rights of the accused). See also Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T
1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (offering no direct reference to human rights protection);
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Jan. 26, 1973, U.S.T 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 178 (offering no direct reference to human rights
protection). Other anti-terrorist conventions make a modest reference to "fair treatment
in all stages of the proceedings." See, e.g., International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages art. 8.2, Dec. 18, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Materials art. 12, Mar. 3, 1980, U.N.T.S. 246; International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res. 52/164, arts. 8, 14, U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/164
(Dec. 15, 1997). But see International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism art. 12, Apr. 13, 2005, U.N. Doc. AIRES/59/766 (stipulating a more elaborate
requirement of human rights protection). It should also be note that the International Law
Commission is showing an increasing interest in the need for a more integrated approach
in its more recent work. See, e.g., U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Code of Crimes against
the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1996] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 26, art. 11, U.N. Doc.
A/51/10. See also U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n, Second Report on the Obligation to Extradite or
Prosecute (aut dedere autjudicare), 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/585 (Jun. 11, 2007) (prepared
by Zdzislaw Galicki).
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II. THE ROME STATUTE
The extent to which the Rome Statute touches on the
question of what is expected of states and their courts in terms of
criminal justice action, and the relevance of human rights
standards in governing such action, lies in the context of the
Court's admissibility criteria (article 17 of the Statute). Since the
Court's jurisdiction is complementary to national criminal
systems,' and thus, exercises its jurisdiction in situations where
states are unable or unwilling to genuinely investigate or prosecute
a case,8 the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), and ultimately, the
Trial Chamber, if the Court's jurisdiction is challenged,' are
required to make an assessment as to whether an ICC intervention
(or engagement) in a particular case is warranted."
Notwithstanding that the Court's jurisdiction is generally limited
to "the most serious crimes of international concern" (article 1 of
the Statute), other limitations abound. Indeed, the OTP must
declare a case inadmissible if it is "being investigated or
prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State
is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or the
prosecution."" In order to determine a state's unwillingness in a
particular case:
7. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 1, 17.
8. But see Avril MacDonald & Roelof Haveman, Prosecutorial Discretion-Some
Thoughts on "Objectifying" the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion of the Prosecutor of
the ICC 2 (Int'l Crim. Ct. Office of the Prosecutor, Apr. 15, 2003) (arguing that the ICC is
not merely a "court of last resort," but could develop a range of functions, including
consultation, monitoring, advise, and education).
9. According to the Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 19(2)(b), "[A] State which
has jurisdiction over the case [may challenge the admissibility of a case on the grounds
referred to in article 17 or challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court] on the ground that it
is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted the case." See
also Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court,
Finalized Draft Text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Nov. 2, 2000, Rule 51
("Information provided under article 17."), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/200/l/Add.1 (2000)
[hereinafter ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence]. "In considering the matters referred
to in article 17, paragraph 2, and in the context of the circumstances of the case, the Court
may consider, inter alia, information that the State referred to in article 17, paragraph 1,
may choose to bring to the attention of the Court showing that its courts meet
internationally recognized norms and standards for the independent and impartial
prosecution of similar conduct, or that the Prosecutor has confirmed in writing to the
Court that the case is being investigated or prosecuted." Id.
10. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 15.
11. Id. at art. 17(1)(a) (emphasis added). But note that there are other criteria for
admissibility as well. Another criterion for admissibility is that the case is of sufficient
gravity. Id. at art. 17(1)(d) (stating that a case must be declared as inadmissible if it "is not
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[T]he Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of
due process recognized by international law, whether one or
more of the following exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the
national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the
person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings
which in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to
bring the person concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were or are not being conducted
independently and impartially, and they were not or are not
being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice.'2
In determining state inability in a particular case, the Court
shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or
unavailability of its national judicial system, the state is unable to
"obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or
otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings."'3
Furthermore, while a case must be declared inadmissible if
"the person has already been tried for conduct which is the subject
of the complaint" (article 17.1.c), according to article 20(3), the
principle ne bis in idem is not applicable if the national proceeding:
(b) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned
from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court; or
(c) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially
in accordance with the norms of due process recognized by
international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the
of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court."). Furthermore, the OTP must
consider the criteria spelled out in article 53 of the Statute for initiating an investigation or
starting a prosecution. See id. at art. 53.
12. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 17 (emphasis added).
13. ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 9, Rule 51 ("Information
provided under article 17") ("In considering the matters referred to in article 17,
paragraph 2, and in the context of the circumstances of the case, the Court may consider,
inter alia, information that the State referred to in article 17, paragraph 1, may choose to
bring to the attention of the Court showing that its courts meet internationally recognized
norms and standards for the independent and impartial prosecution of similar conduct, or
that the State has confirmed in writing to the Prosecutor that the case is being investigated
or prosecuted.") (emphasis added).
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circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the
person concerned to justice. 4
Thus, in principle, the OTP may declare a case admissible
even though some process has occurred and been concluded in a
national setting, if that process failed to be impartial, independent,
or consistent with the norms of due process as recognized in
international law.
Although articles 17 and 20 are meant to govern the actions
of the OTP, to some extent, they indicate the existence of
limitations on the range of judicial actions that a state may pursue
in fulfilling its investigatory and prosecutorial duties under the
Statute. In an important sense, the criteria for determining
unwillingness in article 17 seem to reveal an international concern
over, not only situations reaching a total failure of state judicial
action (i.e., de facto impunity), but also with situations involving
some judicial action, however in a manner that fails to conform
with fundamental human rights.5 Arguably, the provision in
question informs states that they cannot act however they please in
relation to perpetrators of massive crimes, but must respect their
fundamental human rights in the process of bringing them to
justice. 6
From the standpoint of the Statute, the rights that are most
significant are those of the accused and those embodied in
international legal standards of "due process."'7 Respecting such
standards entails ensuring that judicial actions do not suffer from
"unjustified delays"'8 and are carried out by an independent and
14. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 20(3)(a)-(b).
15. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 20(3).
16. Compare Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 20(3) (allowing jurisdiction over
persons for the same conduct already tried in another court where the previous trial
violated basic norms of international human rights), with U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council
[ECOSOC], U.N. Comm'n H.R., Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity, Principle 19, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005) ("Duties of states with regard to the administration
of justice: States shall undertake prompt, independent and impartial investigations of
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and take appropriate
measures in respect of the perpetrators, particularly in the area of criminal justice, by
ensuring that those responsible for serious crimes under international law are prosecuted,
tried and duly punished.").
17. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 17(2).
18. See id. at art. 17(2)(b). For a stricter formulation of this right, see International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9(3), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR] ("Everyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge... shall be
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release.") (emphasis added).
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impartial tribunal.'9 Furthermore, in stipulating that state judicial
action must be "genuine" and must in no way be aimed to "shield
the accused" from facing criminal responsibility, article 17(2) could
also be said to evince a concern with the fate of the victims and
their right to justice. Still, the provision in question fails to advance
a detailed list of fundamental human rights that a state is obliged
to afford an accused person during the adjudication of massive
crime.0 In effect, it is unclear whether in addition to the rights
made explicit in article 17(2), all the rights of the accused usually
incorporated into the notion of due process in international human
rights law must be respected. Several procedural rights are left
unmentioned, including the right to be presumed innocent; the
right to a fair and public hearing; the right to be promptly
informed about the charges in a language the accused fully
understands and speaks; the right to have adequate time to
prepare a defense and examine witnesses against him or her before
and during the trial; the right to have the free assistance of an
interpreter and necessary translations; the right not to be
compelled to confess guilt; and the right to appeal.2 Furthermore,
the provision is silent on whether the Court would ever tolerate
restrictions or derogations of such rights.22
Moreover, there is no consideration in the Statute for the
interests of criminal suspects to be protected from cruel or
inhumane treatment in detention.23 Nor is there any regard to the
severity of the penalties that may lie ahead for those who have
been judged by national courts or tribunals as responsible for
massive crimes.4 In fact, the entire question of acceptable forms of
19. See id. at art. 17(2)(c). For a stricter formulation of this right, see ICCPR, supra
note 18, at art. 14(1) ("In the determination of any criminal charge against him ...
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.") (emphasis added).
20. See ICCPR, supra note 18, at arts. 14-15.
21. Id. See also Rome Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 63-67 (stating that the ICC itself
must respect these rights in conducting its own proceedings).
22. The ICCPR does not list articles 14 and 15 in its provision on non-derogable
rights. ICCPR, supra note 18, at art. 4.2. For an interpretation of these provisions,
including the right of access to court, including fair trial and presumption of innocence as
forming part of the category of peremptory norms and thus non-derogable, see U.N.
Human Rights Comm. [UNHRC], General Comment on Article 4: States of Emergency, TT
14-15, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add 11 (July 24, 2001) [hereinafter General Comment
on Article 4].
23. ICCPR, supra note 18, at arts. 7, 10.
24. But see ICCPR, supra note 18, at art. 6(2) (not outlawing the death penalty for the
most serious crimes in an absolute manner and stipulating that "[i]n countries that have
[Vol. 30:335
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punishment had to be left aside since supporters of capital
punishment objected persistently to the idea of including a
provision in the Statute that imposed restrictions on the range of
penalties, and which forbade the application of the death penalty
in national proceedings.' On July 17, 1998, the President of the
Rome Conference recognized the contentious nature of the issue
and the restrictions it placed on the Court at the last meeting of
the plenary:
The debate at this conference on the issue of which penalties
should be applied by the Court has shown that there is no
international consensus on the inclusion or non-inclusion of the
death penalty. However, in accordance with the principle of
complementarity, national jurisdictions have the primary
responsibility for investigating, prosecuting and punishing
individuals, in accordance with their national laws, for crimes
falling under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court. In this regard, the Court would clearly not be able to
affect national policies in this field. It should be noted that not
including the death penalty in the Statute would not in any way
have a legal bearing on national legislation and practice
regarding the death penalty. Nor shall it be considered as
influencing the development of international customary law or
in any other way the legality of penalties imposed by national
26systems for serious crime.
Thus, a state's recourse to severe or cruel methods of
punishment is outside the judicial purview of the ICC. According
to the complementarity principle, from the standpoint of the
Statute and the Court, states are free to decide on this question in
accordance with their national laws.27
not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most
serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the
crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be
carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court."). See also
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. Doc. AJRES/44/128 (Dec. 15, 1989) (aiming at the abolition of the
death penalty). As of February 11, 2008, the Protocol has 65 parties and 35 signatories,
indicating that the world's states are still divided on the death penalty.
25. See President of the U.N. Security Council, Statement by the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S[PRST/2006/28 (Jun. 22, 2006) [hereinafter Statement by the
President of the Security Council].
26. Id. at 317.
27. See id.
2008]
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Aside from the rights of the accused, the Statute affords little
attention to other rights-bearers whose interests are affected. This
includes the rights of witnesses and their interests to be protected
from intimidation or threats to life, to be treated in a dignified
manner in the course of interrogations or cross-examination, and
so on.' In OTP decisions about opening an investigation or
starting a prosecution, a concern with the fate of witnesses of
massive crimes has entered as a consideration in an extremely
oblique and "instrumentalized" manner as the OTP may declare a
state as unable to carry out investigations or prosecutions if it
cannot "obtain... the necessary evidence and testimony .... "'
The absence of effective witness protection can be relevant in this
respect."0 Inasmuch as no independent consideration is afforded to
the rights of witnesses in national criminal justice settings, it would
be odd to perceive this passage as generating a set of rights or as
manifesting a human rights concern.
Finally, while the preamble of the Statute reminds us that
"during this century millions of children, women and men have
been victims of unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the
conscience of humanity," there is no statutory reference to an
international obligation of states to secure the right to justice for
victims of massive crime.3 In fact, even though the Statute and the
creation of the Court is often said to evince a growing
international commitment to attend to the fate of the victims of
massive crime and their right to justice,2 it is not evident that this
concern must be the basis for and shape national judicial action.3
28. See, e.g., Christine Chinkin, Due Process and Witness Anonymity, 91 AM. J. INT'L
LAW 75 (1997) (an account of the controversies surrounding the status of the rights of
witnesses and how to balance their rights to protection with due process guarantees).
29. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 17(3).
30. But see Int'l Crim. Ct., Office of the Prosecutor, Second Report of the Prosecutor
of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593
(2005), at 6 (Dec. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Second Report of the ICC]. See also Int'l Crim. Ct.,
Office of the Prosecutor, Third Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court to the Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), at 7 (June 14, 2006),
[hereinafter Third Report of the ICC]; infra Part III of this article.
31. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at pmbl. ("Emphasizing in this connection that
nothing in this Statute shall be taken as authorizing any State Party to intervene in an
armed conflict or in the internal affairs of any State.").
32. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International
Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 53 (2008).
33. See id. 1 10 ("Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established
under this Statute shall be complimentary to national criminal jurisdictions.").
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In fact, to the extent that the interests of victims are of direct
relevance to decisions about admissibility and jurisdiction, it is as a
countervailing consideration that speaks against ICC intervention.'
This consideration should not necessarily be understood as
revealing a lack of concern with the fate of victims in national
contexts. On the contrary, it may be seen as a good faith reflection
of a growing realization concerning the complexities in hashing out
what victims are owed in terms of justice. This may lead to the
question of whether victims' interests are better served through
international investigations and prosecutions, or through national
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms." Still, for the purposes
of this article, it is enough to note the absence of recognition of
states' international obligations to victims and the victims' right to
justice in their own national proceedings.
In more general terms, it cannot be assumed that the
extensive human rights protection afforded to all participants in
ICC-conducted proceedings must be applied and transposed into
national settings. For one thing, article 17(2) entails no reference
to this effect, but rather, if anything, seems to articulate a more
modest set of international human rights obligations that states
must respect in exercising criminal jurisdiction over massive crime.
The debate on the death penalty also manifests the prevalence of
an important distinction between human rights standards for ICC
proceedings and those applicable for its national counterparts.
While the Statute imposes an absolute prohibition against the
death penalty in relation to persons judged by the ICC as
responsible for massive crime," it is clear that the complementarity
principle is understood to mean that this standard should not be
seen as having any bearing at all in national settings. 7 Whether
34. See generally Int'l Crim. Ct., Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper on the Interests
of Justice (Sept. 2007) (detailed assessment of article 53 of the Rome Statute and its
implications for the admissibility of a case).
35. See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative Forms of
Justice: Some Interpretative Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, 3 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 695 (2005).
36. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 23, 77.
37. See generally ICCPR, supra note 18. See also Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries, June 15-July 17, 1998, Chairman's Working Paper on Article 75: Fines
and Assets Collected by the Court, 314, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.1831C.1IWGPlL.3[Rev.1 (July
6, 1998) ("States have the primary responsibility for prosecuting and punishing individuals
for crimes falling under the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court. In accordance with the
principle of complementarity between the Court and national jurisdictions, the Court would
clearly have no say on national policies in this field.") (emphasis added).
2008] 343
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other rights-related matters which have been omitted from the
Statute should be understood in the same way-as giving states
free choice from the standpoint of the Statute and the Court to
handle them in whatever way they please-remains unclear.
In this context, it must also be noted that the question about
the possible relevance of human rights standards in an ICC
assessment of state inability and unwillingness to genuinely
investigate or prosecute was afforded considerable attention by a
group of experts which were consulted by the OTP in the initial
stages of its work. According to its paper, the term "genuinely"
restricts the class of national proceedings that require deference
from the ICC.38 At the same time, it recognized the validity of the
concern expressed by states that took part in the negotiations
preceding the adoption of the Rome Statute that national
proceedings should not be found "non-genuine" simply because of
a comparative lack of resources or because of a lack of compliance
with all human rights standards. Nonetheless, its conclusion ended
up being very vague." On one hand, it noted, "although the ICC is
not a 'human rights court,' human rights standards may still be of
relevance and utility in assessing whether the proceedings are
carried out genuinely."" On the other hand, it held that "the
standard for assessing 'genuineness' should reflect appropriate
deference to national systems as well as the fact that the ICC is not
an international court of appeal, nor is it a human rights
monitoring body designed to monitor all the imperfections of legal
systems."'"
III. THE ICC PROSECUTORIAL POLICIES
The first policy paper that was published by the OTP in 2003
paid considerable attention to the question about the meaning of
the complementarity principle and its appropriate application.42 It
38. Int'l Crim. Ct., Office of the Prosecutor, Informal Expert Paper. The Principle of
Complementarity in Practice, 22 at 8 (2003) (prepared by Xabier Agirre, et al.)
[hereinafter ICC Paper-Principle of Complementarity].
39. Id. n.10 at 9-10.
40. Id. 23 at 8-9.
41. Id. 52 at 16. But see id. Annexes 6-7 at 34-35 (replete of references to
international human rights standards and jurisprudence deemed to be of relevance in
assessing issues of admissibility).
42. Int'l Crim. Ct., Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues before the
Office of the Prosecutor, at 4-5 (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter ICC Policy Paper on Issues before
the Office of the Prosecutor]. See also id. at 5 (reaffirming the central role afforded to
[Vol. 30:335
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notes that "[g]iven the many implications of the principle of
complementarity and the lack of court rulings, detailed, exhaustive
guidelines for its operation will probably be developed over the
years." Nevertheless, as a general rule, the policy of the OTP "in
the initial phase of its operation [is that it will take] action only
when there is a clear case of failure to take national action."3 In
other words, the OTP would abstain from engaging in situations
where states do make an effort and, thus refrain from making a
qualitative assessment of those efforts. Instead, the OTP would
focus on total failures of state action.
Since the original prosecutorial policy was set out in 2003, the
OTP has addressed four situations. Three of those situations,
Uganda, the Congo, and the Western African Republic," are the
result of state referrals; that is, straightforward expressions of state
interests in having the ICC leading investigations and the
prosecution of massive crimes committed in their territories as a
result of the mentioned states' inability to pursue these actions
themselves.45 In relation to these situations, or the cases that
emerge from them, the OTP has not made its own qualitative
assessment of state inability.46 Instead, it has been content with
these states' own appreciation of their inability to fulfill their
national jurisdictions: "Indeed, the principle underlying the concept of complementarity is
that States remain responsible and accountable for investigating and prosecuting crimes
committed under their jurisdiction and that national systems are expected to maintain and
enforce adherence to international standards.").
43. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). Furthermore, as a general rule, the Office of the
Prosecutor should focus its investigative and prosecutorial efforts and resources on those
who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the state or organization
allegedly responsible for those crimes. Id. at 6-7.
44. Press Release, Int'l Crim. Ct., Office of the Prosecutor, Background: The
Situation in the Central African Republic, at 1 (May 22 2007). The government of the
Central African Republic referred the situation to the OTP. The Cour de Cassation, the
country's highest judicial body, subsequently confirmed that the national justice system
was unable to carry out the complex proceedings necessary to investigate and prosecute
the alleged crimes, in particular to collect evidence and obtain the accused. Id. at 3.
45. For a more in-depth consideration of state-referrals, see Claus Kress, 'Self-
referrals' and 'Waivers of Complementarity', 2 J. INT'L CaIM. JUST. 944 (2004).
46. ICC Policy Paper on Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 42, at 5
(inaction of state may be the appropriate course of action when the group bitterly divided
by conflict may agree to a prosecution by a Court perceived as neutral and impartial; in
such cases, there will be no question of unwillingness or inability under Article 17). But
note that state voluntarism might not be an appropriate reason for not assessing state
inability and unwillingness as it may well be the case that states prefer to transfer some
investigative or prosecutorial burdens to international organs even though their own
institutions would be able to handle them. See Burke-White, supra note 32.
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investigative and prosecutorial duties demonstrated by the
referral.47 The fourth situation now before the ICC-that of
Darfur-has required a more careful assessment of what is meant
by state unwillingness or inability to genuinely fulfill its
investigative or prosecutorial duties. The Darfur situation, which
was brought to the Court as a result of a Security Council referral,8
has proven problematic in several respects. One trouble is that
Sudan, not being a state party, contests the legality of an ICC
intervention. In particular, Sudan challenges the jurisdiction of the
Court on the basis that it is investigating, or has investigated, the
cases concerned, and has also established special tribunals.49
Because of the contentious nature of the matter, the OTP has had
to travel to Sudan in an attempt to verify the Sudanese assertions.
In the course of this process, a more substantive assessment of how
states conduct their affairs emerged."
Reporting for the first time in the Summer of 2005 to the UN
Security Council, the Chief Prosecutor emphasized that his Office
would not limit its review to the question of whether Sudan was
investigating or prosecuting the crimes or persons concerned (or
had done so), but also "whether any such proceedings [conducted
in Sudan] meet the standards of genuineness as defined by article 17
of the Rome Statute.""1 Furthermore, the Chief Prosecutor's second
and third reports to the Security Council note that "the continuing
insecurities in Darfur prohibit the establishment of an effective
system for the protection of victims and witnesses," and that "this
constitutes a serious impediment to the conduct of effective
investigations into alleged serious crimes in Darfur by national
judicial bodies."52 In other words, as a result of the UN Security
Council referral of the Darfur situation, the initial approach to
complementarity (as spelled out in the 2003 policy paper) had to
be revised and extended to an appraisal of the nature and spirit of
47. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 9, Rule 53 ("Deferral
provided for in article 18, paragraph 2").
48. S.C. Res. 1593, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (March 31, 2005) (the Prosecutor of
the ICC decided to open investigation in the Darfur on June 6, 2005).
49. Situation in Darfur, Situation No. ICC-02/05, Submissions Requesting a Stay of
Proceedings in limine litis, 1 1 (Oct. 25, 2006).
50. Id. at 5.
51. Int'l Crim. Ct., Office of the Prosecutor, [First] Report of the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court to the Security Council pursuant to UNSC 1593 (2005), 4
(June 19, 2005) (emphasis added).
52. Second Report of the ICC, supra note 30, at 6. See also Third Report of the ICC,
supra note 30, at 7.
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state action. Nonetheless, once it was clear that Sudan had not
investigated or prosecuted the OTP targeted incidents or persons,
the Office returned to its initial policy stance." Thus, the four
subsequent reports to the UN Security Council refrain from
elaborating further on the meaning and application of "genuinely,"
"unable," "unwilling," etc., but only affirm that Sudan has failed to
investigate and prosecute any of the specific incidents of concern
for the OTP.' Still, in the case of new efforts of Sudan to
investigate or prosecute some of the incidents, the question of
whether the need to assess or evaluate state action will re-emerge
as state inability or unwillingness is seen as an ongoing
assessment.55
IV. THE OTP PROMOTION OF NATIONAL PROCEEDINGS
Recent OTP statements indicate a growing interest in the
potential role of national criminal jurisdictions in achieving the
goals of international criminal justice as spelled out in the Rome
Statute; these statements encourage national jurisdictions to not
remain disinterested in their potential contributions, but rather to
shoulder their responsibilities to the extent possible.6 The
Prosecutorial Strategy launched in September 2006 invokes as a
first principle that states have the "primary responsibility for
preventing and punishing atrocities in their own territories";
53. Third Report of the ICC, supra note 30, at 7; Int'l Crim. Ct., Office of the
Prosecutor, Fourth Report of the International Criminal Court to the U.N. Security Council
Pursuant to UNSCR 1593, 10 (Dec. 14, 2006) (prepared by Louis Moreno Ocampo)
[hereinafter Fourth Report of the ICC]; Int'l Crim. Ct., Office of the Prosecutor, Fifth
Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council
Pursuant to UNSCR 1593, 12 (June 7, 2007) [hereinafter Fifth Report of the ICC]; Int'l
Crim. Ct., Office of the Prosecutor, Sixth Report of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court, to the U.N. Security Council Pursuant to UNSC 1593, 15 (Dec. 5, 2007)
[hereinafter Sixth Report of the ICC].
54. In response to the Prosecutor's Application to summon the persons concerned,
the Trial Chamber held that "it is a sine qua non that national proceedings do not
encompass both the person and the conduct which are the subject of the case before the
Court." Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad Harun ("Ahmad Harun") and Ali Muhammad
Ali Abd-A1-Rahman ("Ali Kushayb"), Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Decision on the
Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, $T 23-24, (Apr. 27, 2007).
55. See, e.g., Third Report of the ICC, supra note 30, at 7.
56. But see Int'l Crim. Ct., Office of the Prosecutor, Draft Regulations of the Office of
the Prosecutor, at 13 (Jun. 3, 2003). Note that the section related to the complementarity
principle has so far not been substantiated. It only mentions that issues to be considered in
this respect include: standard monitoring activities; open sources evaluation; bilateral
agreements, activities, dialogue; assessment of inability, unwillingness; and
complementarity in the judicial process.
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furthermore, it stresses that ICC intervention is exceptional and
that the Court will only step in when states "fail to conduct
investigations or prosecutions or where they purport to do so when
in reality are unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out
proceedings.'" Critically, it declares that:
[T]he Office has adopted a positive approach to
complementarity, meaning that it encourages national
proceedings where possible; relies on national and international
networks; and participates in a system of international
cooperation. 8
Furthermore, according to the same document, one of its five
key objectives in the next three years (2007-2009) will be to foster:
[A] type of international cooperation that will assist states and
international organizations to prevent and resolve conflicts
producing massive crimes and address impunity for these
crimes. Depending on the situation, this may involve
international cooperation for the promotion of national
proceedings, traditional mechanisms or other tools, with the
involvement of a variety of actors. 9
Thus, the OTP's commitment to "promote national
proceedings where possible" will not be restricted to general
declarations, but is supposed to be translated into concrete
schemes of international cooperation that serve such promotion
and, in fact, assist states in the process of shouldering their
responsibilities. Another notable feature of the emerging positive
approach is that it is not restricted to "national proceedings," but
would also cover "traditional mechanisms or other tools." Thus,
there is a considerable recognition regarding the need for
flexibility in the interpretation of what is required of states to
discharge their statutory duty.
The advancement of a positive account of complementarity is
best explained as the unequivocal response of the ICC to a series
of potentially different challenges that have come to the surface in
57. Int'l Crim. Ct., Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, at 5
(Sept. 14 2006) [hereinafter ICC Report on Prosecutorial Strategy].
58. Id. But see ICC Paper-Principle of Complementarity, supra note 38, at 5
(emphasis added) (idea of a positive account of the complementarity, principle already
present: "[I]t should be a high priority of the Office of the Prosecutor to actively remind
states of their responsibility to adopt and implement effective legislation and to encourage
them to carry out effective investigations and prosecutions. Such encouragement could be
general, for example, in public statements; or specific, for example, in bilateral meetings.").
59. ICC Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, supra note 57, at 9 (emphasis added).
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the course of seeking to make the ICC work in the last four years.
For one thing, there is a potential challenge that the ICC will
become overburdened with cases and, hence, needs to be able to
off-load its burdens of responsibility in ending impunity in massive
crime situations to national criminal jurisdictions.' Another
potential challenge is the inability of the Court to respond to the
so-called "impunity gap."61 In spite of the ample fulfillment of its
mandate, the ICC cannot be expected to end impunity alone;
rather, a collaborative effort that involves a range of criminal
jurisdictions, including national ones, will be required. A third
potential challenge for the ICC has to do with its own difficulties
of delivering justice, compared to that of its national counterparts.
It is clear that, for years to come, the Court will face several
cooperation problems that will stand in the way of efficient
evidence collection, protection of witnesses, and transportation of
those who are facing charges at the Hague.62 Furthermore, being
located far away from the crime scene, in both geographical and
cultural terms, the ICC also faces an extraordinary task in seeking
to ensure that justice not only is done, but is also perceived to be
done from the standpoint of the victims and affected populations.63
In light of these considerations, national criminal jurisdictions are
not only needed, but are also better situated to bring the
perpetrators of the most serious crimes to justice.
Notwithstanding the virtues of a positive complementarity
approach, however, the question of acceptable manners of
national judicial engagement, the relevance of human rights
standards, and the role of the Court in relation to these standards,
60. See, e.g., ICC Paper-Principle of Complementarity, supra note 38, 60. See also
Prosecutor Luis-Moreno Ocampo, Address to Third Session of the Assembly of States
Parties to the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court 2 (Sept. 6, 2004)
[hereinafter Ocampo, Address to Third Session] (positive approach defined as a core
policy). According to Prosecutor Ocampo's statement, a focused prosecutorial strategy is
now one of OTP's core policies. This means that its own efforts will center "on
perpetrators bearing the greatest responsibility, with a policy of short investigations,
targeted indictments and expeditious trials, and an interdisciplinary investigative
approach, adjusted to the peculiarities of each situation." Ocampo, Address to Third
Session, supra, at 2.
61. ICC Policy Paper on Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 42, at 7.
62. For a comment on the need for substantial efforts for arrest and surrender, see
ICC Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, supra note 57, at 8.
63. For an argument about the importance of cultural proximity among the
participants in criminal proceedings in order to achieve that justice is seen to be done, see
Jessica Almqvist, The Impact of Cultural Diversity on International Criminal Proceedings,
4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUSTICE 745 (2006).
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is brought to the forefront of the legal debate. The adoption of a
positive complementarity approach means that the Court is no
longer neutral towards the nature and spirit of national judicial
actions; rather, it endorses them and promotes them "where
possible." Then the cehtral question is whether it will promote
national proceedings in an unqualified manner to the extent that
"nearly anything goes" or whether it will stress a number of
principles and rules purporting to inform and constrain such
proceedings. Though it is correct that "the ICC is not a human
rights monitoring body, and its role is not to ensure perfect
procedures in compliance with all international standards,"' the
adoption of a positive complementarity approach, if translated into
concrete actions, requires consideration of the relationship
between complementarity and human rights.
V. DEFINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND
COMPLEMENTARITY
How will the Court react to national proceedings that fail to
respect proper defense guarantees (e.g., the right to defense) or
proceedings that fail to secure the right of the accused to examine
evidence and witnesses? How will it react to national efforts to
conduct investigations or trials which fail to protect witnesses with
well-founded fears of being intimidated or even assassinated after
having provided their information or given their testimonies? How
will it respond to a national proceeding against a former dictator
that only lasts two hours, culminating in a cold-blooded execution
against a wall? How will it approach situations of vastly prolonged
detentions of persons suspected of being responsible for the most
serious crimes while waiting for trial? What is, in fact, its position
on nati6nal laws that make massive crimes seem less severe than
they really are by making the persons responsible for such crimes
lay down their weapons and accept a peace accord that includes
only some account of criminal justice?
These questions are already subject to heated legal
controversy in light of real-life failures to ensure full respect for
human rights in the course of bringing perpetrators of massive
crimes to justice. Still, more controversy is to be expected as a
result of increasing national efforts to exercise criminal jurisdiction
within the framework of the Rome justice system. As noted
64. ICC Paper- Principle of Complementarity, supra note 38, at 15, 49.
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earlier,65 the Statute affords very modest guidance to the Court on
appropriate responses. In principle, there may be several possible
approaches to balancing the relationship between
complementarity and human rights for the Court to consider. The
remainder of this article sheds light on three such accounts. Each
of them is inspired and builds upon different positions in ongoing
debates about liberal tolerance and its limits.' Thus, the
subsequent discussion of these approaches assumes that the
toleration debates are useful and relevant as a starting point for a
more comprehensive assessment of options available, including
their respective advantages and shortcomings from the standpoint
of the Court. The utility of these debates, for the purpose of
advancing these approaches, stems from their emphasis on the fact
of pluralism. In this article, the notion of pluralism refers to the
diverse ways of bringing perpetrators of massive crimes to justice
as manifested in different national contexts. The basic question is
whether the ICC should impose restrictions on this kind of
pluralism and, if so, on what grounds.
A. An "Open-Handed" Toleration Approach
The first approach to be considered is the "open-handed"
approach, which emphasizes that all national proceedings are to be
tolerated by the OTP. Thus, the OTP would refrain, as a matter of
principle, from opening an investigation in a particular situation or
starting a prosecution of a particular case, if that case is being or
has been investigated or prosecuted through a national
proceeding, as long as the national effort to discharge the statutory
duty does not undermine the basic purpose of ending impunity.
With this approach, the OTP would only object to a national
proceeding that, in fact, aims to shield the accused.
At first glance, there are several factors that support the
adoption of an open-handed toleration approach. These include:
the vague mandate of the ICC regarding matters of national
human rights protection; the relatively modest attention paid to
methods of bringing perpetrators of serious crimes to justice
65. See supra Part II.
66. There is a wealth of literature on this topic. See, e.g., SUSAN MENDUS,
JUSTIFYING TOLERATION: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (1988);
TOLERATION AND ITS LIMITS (Melissa Williams & Jeremy Waldron eds., NYU Press,
2008). See also Chandran Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, in 39 ETHNICITY AND GROUP
RIGHTS 69 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 2000).
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through other international criminal law instruments;67 and the fact
that the main problem in the fight against impunity continues to be
state inaction rather than action. In addition, the aim of achieving
universal acceptance of the Rome Statute's terms may also speak
in favor of this approach.' Indeed, it is no coincidence that the
states that remain outside the circle of those "fully committed" to
the Rome Statute and to the ICC are those known to be
particularly wary of cultural variations among states, especially
those variations concerning the method of conducting
investigations, prosecutions and punishment of serious crimes.69
Thus, in light of the universalistic aspirations of the Court, a more
rigorous approach towards enforcement of human rights and an
insistence on full compliance with human rights standards could
undermine the prospects of committing these states to the virtues
of sharing a common system of criminal justice.
The open-handed toleration approach is enthused by, what in
political theoretical studies is defined as, a "libertarian" stance
towards pluralism, although the former is applied to govern the
relationship between states and international institutions (in this
case, the ICC) and focuses on matters of criminal justice." Like the
libertarian, stance, the open-handed approach seriously considers
the realities of pluralism and the difficulties of defining a
"universal yardstick" for judging which way is right or acceptable
in all situations." Indeed, this approach assumes that there is no
such common standard. Instead, it emphasizes that each actor has
its own mode of dealing with serious crime, each system will
develop its response once faced with a situation, taking into
account its own particular beliefs of what justice means and
requires. 2 Furthermore, given the absence of a common standard
and the fact that a national settlement is not the manifestation of a
67. See generally Kleffner, supra note 5; Sluiter, supra note 5.
68. Sixth Session of the Assembly of States Parties, Nov. 30-Dec. 14, 2007, Plan of
Action of the Assembly of States Parties for Achieving Universality and Full
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Annex 1(1), ICC-
ASP/6/20 (Dec. 14, 2007).
69. See, e.g., Steven C. Roach, Arab States and the Role of Islam in the International
Criminal Court, 53 POLITICAL STUD. 143, 145-47 (2005).
70. For a contemporary libertarian account of toleration, see Kukathas, supra note
66, at 72-78. For an understanding of international society as one regime in which the
notion of toleration is applicable, see MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 14-36 (Yale
University Press 1997).
71. See WALZER, supra note 70.
72. See id.
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haphazard or coincidental series of events, but rather the upshot of
a national understanding of justice, an outside intervention (in this
case an international judicial intervention) could be seen as an
arbitrary attack on settled national judicial arrangements and an
affront to the beliefs that underlie and shape them. In other words,
a libertarian stance emphasizes the counterproductive effect that
an outside intervention could have in situations where states desire
to discharge their statutory duty even though their method of
doing so seems offensive or disturbing from the standpoint of
outsiders (in this case the ICC)."3
Even though an open-handed toleration approach sits
uncomfortably with the view that supports imposing more rigorous
moral restrictions on the range of possible modes of justice, it is
not entirely hostile to the idea of imposing some restrictions. The
open-handed toleration approach, however, imposes restrictions
on the way in which states conduct their criminal justice affairs
only if it is necessary to safeguard or restore international
security.74 In practice, this means that the limitations would be
triggered in situations deemed to constitute an international
security threat. To the extent that a state is capable of acting
against perpetrators of serious crimes by removing them from the
public and punishing them for their criminal acts, there is no need
for the Court to enforce restrictions on that state's particular
course of action. This is by no means a controversial prosecutorial
approach in the light of the spirit of emerging OTP policies. For
one thing, as noted in Part III of this article, the Office has
adopted a stance according to which it will focus on situations
involving total state failure to prevent impunity: In addition, the
OTP has expressed its intent to be attentive to the realities of
73. Yet, note that this approach does not condemn the international recourse to
"softer" or "non-coercive" forms of international influence on state judicial action,
including criticism, negotiation, communication, or even the creation of incentive schemes.
Also notable is the fact that what constitutes "coercive" is a contested notion. Robert
Nozick regards as coercive not merely the actual use of force, but also the very threat of
force. Furthermore, he also considers the relevance of a dependency relation. See Robert
Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
ERNEST NAGEL 440-472 (Sidney Morenbesser and Patrick Suppes eds., 1969). In contrast,
John Rawls considers as coercive not merely the institution of law, but also public opinion
and social pressure. JOHN RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE 117 (Harvard University Press
1999) (1971). This article does not elaborate on the discussion of whether an international
judicial intervention, can in fact be said to be coercive, in the light of the requirement of
state consent (with the exception of Security Council referrals).
74. See Kukathas, supra note 66, at 72-78.
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pluralism by affirming that it "will take into consideration the need
to respect the diversity of legal systems, traditions and cultures."'"
Notably, it recognizes the close nexus between its own mandate
and security-oriented concerns. For example, one of the OTP's
stated objectives is to make efforts to "reinforce [its impact to
deter] by aligning the strategies of the Office with broader efforts
aimed at stabilizing situations of violence and crime."76
Nevertheless, in spite of its initial plausible appeal, the open-
handed toleration approach suffers from several problematic
assumptions. This article contends that these problems will come
to the surface in the course of advancing the Court's
complementarity policies. One such problem with this approach is
its constant need to explain why intervention in general is not
necessary or justified. In particular, the approach makes an
unfortunate assumption. By viewing action as solely a
manifestation of belief, it does not consider the possibility that
action (as well as inaction) may be shaped, at least to some extent,
by a number of unfortunate circumstances (e.g., insecurity,
violence, conflict, scarcity, etc.). Thus, it does not dwell on the
range of reasons for international engagement (and the many
forms of softer engagement).
Recognition of factors other than a belief that may lead to the
development (or lack thereof) of national justice systems, allows
international assistance to overcome, or at least, reduce the many
obstacles that may stand in the way of progress." Still, from the
75. ICC Policy Paper on Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 42, at 5.
76. ICC Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, supra note 57, at 9. Also, see the Chief
Prosecutor's comment on the Darfur situation: "Justice for past and present crimes will
contribute to enhancing security and send an important warning to those individuals who
might otherwise continue to resort to violence and criminality as a means of achieving
their aims." Fourth Report of the ICC, supra note 53, at 2. In an address to the General
Assembly, Philippe Kirsch noted, "The International Criminal Court was created to break
the vicious cycle of crimes, impunity and conflict. It was set up to contribute to justice and
the prevention of crimes, and thereby to peace and security." Philippe Kirsch, Address to
the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Doc # 3 (Nov. 1, 2007). Yet, note that Kirsch also states
that the ICC was established to achieve several objectives, including "to put an end to
impunity for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, to contribute to the
prevention of these crimes which threaten peace and security and to guarantee lasting
respect for and the enforcement of international justice. These aims are universal. They
are reflected in the Charter of the United Nations, and in the statements and practice of
the Member States and of the organization of the United Nations." Id. at 6.
77. Whether a particular agent's lack of resources can generate obligations on others
to assist is a topic of extensive debate in political theoretical studies. For example, Ronald
Dworkin makes a distinction between the reason for the lack of resources of an agent as
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standpoint of a libertarian account of toleration, recognition of
state inability is something of an anomaly. Thus, if we take the
claim about state inability seriously (and there is growing
international support for the need to take into account this
possibility),"8 it becomes necessary to advance an alternative to the
open-handed toleration approach. Specifically, an approach that
can house the notion of state inability and can support its
attendant claims for international assistance and cooperation in
this field of public affairs is needed.
Another problematic assumption underlying the open-handed
toleration approach is the supposed absence of a common
standard of conduct in the area of public affairs. The fact that most
of the world's states have accepted the terms of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including articles 14 and 15
(concerning the rights to due process and a fair trial), seems to
undermine this assumption.79 While it is important to recognize
that there are cases of blatant disregard for these provisions as well
as disagreement on how to interpret their concrete implications,
including what counts as legitimate restrictions, and whether
derogations are ever justified,' the fact that most states have
being either a matter of circumstance or choice. Only the former case generates a right to
assistance. See generally. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF EQUALITY (1999).
78. Note that state inability is recognized in the Statute itself. Rome Statute, supra
note 1, at art. 17.3. But there is also a growing strand of research that focuses on the notion
of failed or failing states. The notion of failed or failing state is contested. One indicator of
general state failure is inability to "deliver political goods-security, education, health
services, economic opportunity, a legal framework of order and a judicial system to
administer it .... " Robert I. Rothberg, The New Nature of Nation-State Failure, 25:3
WASH. Q. 85, 87 (2002). Although "only a handful of the world's 191 states can now be
categorized as failed, or collapsed... [s]everal dozen more, however, are weak and serious
candidates for failure." Id. at 85.
79. As of April 18, 2008, one hundred sixty-one states had ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights while thirty-one states have not done so. Among
those who have not ratified are China, Cuba, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Singapore, and the United Arab Emirate. But note that, as of March 5, 2008, fifty of the
ratifying states have not ratified the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights which recognizes the right of an individual to complain about
human rights violations allegedly committed by their state to the UN Human Rights
Committee. See Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Homepage,
http://www.ohchr.orgEN/PagesWelcomePage.aspx (last visited Jul. 14, 2008).
80. For a claim about the non-derogable nature of due process and fair trial rights as
laid down in articles 14 and 15 of the ICCPR, see General Comment on Article 4, supra
note 22, 11 14-15. For a recent account of the meaning of fair trial rights (ICCPR, article
14), see U.N. Human Rights Comm. [UNHRC], General Comment on Article 14: The
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signed on to these provisions gives them some cross-cultural
validity.'
A third problem with an open-handed toleration approach is
its assumption that any mode of bringing perpetrators of serious
crimes to justice, does in fact succeed in restoring security. A
blatant disregard of due process and the right to a fair trial risks
blurring the difference between revenge and punishment and fails
to break the "vicious cycle of crimes."82 If the aim is to improve the
security situation, some attention must be paid to the basic
conditions for breaking that cycle.83 Thus, even if the Court adopts
complementarity policies that place security-oriented concerns at
the forefront (whether applied to prosecutions or more
supervisory functions), it still cannot remain ignorant of how states
go about their criminal justice affairs. Rather, it must insist that
states respect some basic principles to govern their conduct in this
field in order to realize the aims of international security. The key
question then turns on what those principles should be.
B. The Alternative of a Human Rights Engaging Stance
The current absence of a more restrictive approach to
toleration, one that delimits the range of acceptable national
proceedings, does not mean that such an approach is impossible.
One reason for the Court's failure to address the question so far is
that it simply has not been confronted with the particular issue.
Yet, relevant international experience indicates that once faced
with the need to collaborate with national criminal courts, the
Court will need to engage in the more thorny questions relating to
human rights.
For nearly ten years, the two ad hoc international criminal
tribunals did not consider a more positive role for national courts
in affected states. The primacy of jurisdiction that is attributed to
these two tribunals is based on the inability of the affected states
to investigate and prosecute the serious crimes that were
Right of Equality Before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial, U.N. Doc
CCPR/C/GC/32 (Aug. 23 2007).
81. But note that it is a different question whether the ICC should be engaged in
monitoring or evaluating state performance in relation to these provisions. In this section,
the question is left open.
82. Kirsch, supra note 76, at 3.
83. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, U.N. Doe. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) [hereinafter
U.N. Secretary-General, Rule of Law].
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committed.' Yet, in the course of an ever-growing pressure to
complete their work in addition to some improvements in terms of
national judicial capabilities and legal frameworks, the two
tribunals have come to develop a closer relationship with national
courts.' In the process of this work, neither of the two tribunals
have compromised or ignored human rights standards. In fact, they
have insisted on full compliance, at least insofar as the rights of the
accused are concerned. 6 Indeed, respect for human rights,
including a national prohibition of the death penalty, has been
affirmed as a condition for allowing affected states and others to
take part in bringing persons deemed to be responsible for the
most serious crimes to justice." Thus, in making the decision of
whether to refer cases back to national criminal jurisdictions, the
ICTY's Office of the Prosecutor must ensure that the "accused will
receive a fair trial and that the death penalty will not be imposed
or carried out."' In a similar vein, the same language has been
incorporated into the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence.89
84. For example, see Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 58 (Oct. 2, 1995), noting that:
"[w]hen an international tribunal such as the present one is created, it must be endowed
with primacy over national courts. Otherwise, human nature being what it is, there would
be a perennial danger of international crimes being characterized as 'ordinary crimes' or
proceedings being 'designed to shield the accused,' or cases not being diligently
prosecuted."
85. See Int'l Crim. Tribunal for the former Yugo., Assessments of the President and the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on the
Implementation of the Completion Strategy of the Tribunal Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1534 (2004) 5 (Nov. 2004) [hereinafter 2004 ICTY Completion Strategy].
86. At the same time, it must be noted that the two international criminal tribunals
focus on fair trial rights and death penalty alone. Thus, their main concern is not with
failures to protect the interestsof other rights-bearers who are involved in the judicial
process, such as victims and witnesses. A substantive toleration approach, on the other
hand, would need to afford equal respect and consideration to all participants. In its
commitment to ensure, or else promote full compliance with all international human rights
standards of all states, it cannot compromise or disregard certain participants in designing
a scheme of cooperation.
87. See 2004 ICTY Completion Strategy, supra note 85.
88. In the case of the ICTY, "the Referral Bench may order such referral proprio
motu or at the request of the Prosecutor, after having given to the Prosecutor and, where
applicable, the accused, the opportunity to be heard and after being satisfied that the
accused will receive a fair trial and that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried
out." Prosecutor v. Savo Todovic, Case No. IT-97-25/1, Decision on Rule 11 bis Referral,
11 (emphasis added). Even after the transfer of the indicted cases to national criminal
jurisdictions, the Office may monitor national proceedings and remains able to revoke the
transfer of a case if it finds that a fair trial is not being conducted. 2004 ICTY Completion
Strategy, supra note 85.
89. 2004 ICTY Completion Strategy, supra note 85, at 5.
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In order to make referrals effective, the ICTY has established
partnerships with national organizations in the former Yugoslavia
aimed at improving their capabilities to conduct fair trials." The
Court also made repeated calls for international assistance in
advancing national judicial capabilities to ensure that all cases that
have been referred back are conducted in full compliance with
standards of due process."
Completion efforts for the ICTR have proven difficult, not in
the least, because of human rights concerns. Until recently
Rwanda applied the death penalty,' therefore, referrals to
Rwandan national courts were seen as out of the question.93
Instead, the tribunal had to consider offers from other national
criminal jurisdictions, which claimed to conform to the ICTR's
stated conditions.9" Yet, Rwanda's recent abolition of the death
penalty coupled with its adoption of new laws aimed at
guaranteeing fair trials has led the ICTR Prosecutor to file three
referral requests back to its courts. 5 In spite of the challenges
resulting from its insistence on full compliance with the rights of
the accused, the ICTR recently reaffirmed its commitment to this
goal in stating that "it continues to seek new measures to increase
efficiency and further expedite its work, whilst at all times
90. Int'l Crim. Tribunal for the former Yugo., Assessments of the President and the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia on the
Implementation of the Completion Strategy of the Tribunal Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1534 (2004) 35 (Dec. 2007).
91. Id. at 39. See also Int'l Crim. Tribunal for the former Yugo., Assessments of the
President and the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia on the Implementation of the Completion Strategy of the Tribunal Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1534 (2004) 25, 25 & 56 (May 2007). See also 2004 ICTY
Completion Strategy, supra note 85, at 27-30 (mentioning specific problems).
92. Human Rights Watch World Report 2003, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2003,
http:llwww.hrw.org/legacylwr2k3lpdflrwanda.pdf.
93. Id.
94. Int'l Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda, Completion Strategy of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, $1 38-39 (May 31, 2007) [hereinafter May 2007 ICTR
Completion Strategy]. In addition, after having rejected Norway on the basis that it lacked
jurisdiction under its own laws in relation to the crime of genocide, the ICTR Trial
Chamber engaged in a lengthy evaluation of the extent to which the Netherlands, which
had received the case, had complied with international standards for a fair trial and in
particular the rights of the accused. Id. 37.
. 95. Int'l Crim. Tribunal for Rwanda, Assessments of the President and the Prosecutor
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on the Implementation of the
Completion Strategy of the Tribunal, 35 (Nov. 16 2007), available at
http:169.94.11.53/ENGLISHlcompletionstrats-2007-676e.pdf.
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continuing to safeguard the fair trial and due process rights of the
accused."96
Evidently, insisting on full compliance with human rights is
not an unproblematic stance for the ICC to adopt. For one thing,
as shown in the case of the two ad hoc tribunals, it can undermine
the prospects of effective national court performance and slow
down the entire process aimed at putting an end to impunity. It
can also lead to the problematic situation wherein different
standards apply in national courts for different perpetrators. For
example, the ICTR's pressure on Rwanda to prohibit the death
penalty has led to a situation where the death penalty will not be
applied in cases that have been referred by the ICTR while the
death penalty can still be applied in other cases. Furthermore,
unlike the ICTR and the ICTY whose human rights mandates are
limited to safeguard the rights of the accused, the ICC is expected
to be more sensitive towards the interests of the victims and,
indeed, shape its actions in their favor. In other words, looking
only to previous international practice does not offer an accurate
account of what a "human rights engaging" stance for the Court
should look like. Still, these practices indicate that it will not be
possible for the Court to completely avoid them.
From the standpoint of the ICC, as indicated in the Sudan
case, a situation of state failure can transform itself into a more
complex condition that requires a direct assessment of state action.
Furthermore, even in the case of state referrals, human rights
concerns will, in all likelihood, arise as a result of attention to the
so-called impunity gap and the subsequent interest in making
national criminal court systems functional. Yet, if the OTP wishes
to develop its agenda in cooperation with states and other
international actors in order to fill this gap, it needs to define the
relationship between complementarity and human rights. In
negotiating the terms for cooperation, questions of acceptable
methods and the relevance of human rights standards will rise to
the forefront.' A policy of avoidance will not survive this
development.
96. Id. 63. Similar to the ICTY, the ICTR conducts programs aimed at capacity-
building in Rwanda. See May 2007 ICTR Completion Strategy, supra note 94, 38.
97. See, e.g., Agreement Between the International Criminal Court and the European
Union on Cooperation and Assistance, Apr. 10, 2006, 2006 O.J. (L 115) 50, pmbl.
(stressing the importance of "the administration of justice in accordance with procedural
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1. A Liberal Toleration Approach
Against this background, this article considers two possible
human rights engaging approaches. The first, is defined as a liberal
toleration approach. It is akin to a liberal autonomy-based account
of toleration as it has developed in contemporary political
theoretical studies in that it articulates a set of liberal ideals. Yet,
that account is applied to govern state-individual relations and the
extent to which states should seek to shape individual moral
aspirations and ideals. In contrast,, the liberal toleration approach
is centered on international institutions-state relations and focuses
on the extent to which international institutions should be involved
in seeking to promote certain ideal models of state performance in
the field of criminal justice, whether through assistance,
cooperation, consultation, education, or even coercion, including
pressure and opinion.
The approach assumes that the ideal model of criminal justice
is one that respects all fundamental human rights and is the model
of aspiration in liberal democratic states and ICC proceedings. It
refrains from engaging in debate about alternative models as it
regards the liberal democratic model as the uniquely correct one
for all places and situations. In other words, it does not ponder the
reality of pluralism in the field of criminal justice and the possible
relevance of this pluralism in developing criminal justice models.
Moreover, as it ignores the possibility of a deeper pluralism (i.e.,
conflicting claims about the true or correct model), it supposes that
all state failures to conform stem from state inability rather than
unwillingness. According to this approach, the main difficulty lies
in finding the most effective measures to overcome the obstacles
that stand in the way of allowing states to conform national
criminal systems in keeping with the stated ideals. Most often, it
attempts to do so through different forms of international
assistance or educational programs. States that refuse to change
their ways would not qualify for assistance, but would instead, be
subject to pressure and/or critical opinion, often being labeled as
"deviant," "radical," or "outlaw" states.
The autonomy-based approach to toleration has come to be
heavily criticized, especially in recent years, for its complete
refusal to account for pluralism and for its failure to consider the
fairness with particular reference to the rights of the accused provided in the Rome
Statute.").
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"reasonableness" of non-liberal views. It is furthermore criticized
for its patronizing attitude and if taken to its extreme, the risk it
poses in augmenting longstanding intercultural differences and
transforming them into conflicts that are difficult to resolve. In
other words, it leaves itself open to accusations of being a grossly
intolerant position in an already divided world.8 That being said,
while these kinds of criticisms are relevant to international legal
debates, they are more often raised in the context of legal
transplants or in the broader context of peace-building.9 Such
critiques are becoming less frequent in the field of international
criminal justice law where there is an ever-growing recognition of
the need for cultural sensitivity and adjustment to realities on the
ground.i
For the Court, the substantive toleration approach might be
difficult to adopt. For one thing, it seems to go beyond the Court's
own mandate.' Moreover, it may be unfortunate for the Court to
push for high ideals that are regarded as western in content and
spirit while at the same time seeking to advance an all-inclusive or
near-inclusive approach in the fight against impunity. It should
also be noted that the ideal criminal justice model is itself a topic
of extensive debate even in liberal democracies (e.g., whether it
must have a jury system, cross-examination, or a criminal process
that integrates the civil claims of victims for reparation).
Furthermore, even if it were assumed that liberal democracies
boast the best range of criminal justice models, there may still be
questions about their direct workability in situations of massive
crimes without any adjustment to the extreme challenges
associated with such situations, such as the vast numbers of
98. See, e.g., U.N. ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS, REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL
GROUP (2006).
99. See, e.g., Michael Barnett, Illiberal Peacebuilding and Liberal States: Remarks
Prepared for the Social Science Research Council's Roundtable on Humanitarian Action
(Feb. 8, 2005), available at http://programs.ssrc.org/emergencies/publications/barnett.pdf.
100. From having favored classical prosecutions with extensive rights protection, the
Security Council, argues that: "The Council intends to continue forcefully to fight
impunity with appropriate means and draws attention to the full range of justice and
reconciliation mechanisms to be considered, including national, international and 'mixed'
criminal courts and tribunals, and as truth and reconciliation commissions." Statement by
the President of the Security Council, supra note 25.
101. Although, arguably the Court could align itself with this approach by emphasizing
the open-wording of article 17(2) of the Statute, which defines cases of "unwillingness"
according to which states can be considered unwilling to prosecute and thereby making
the issue admissible to the ICC.
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perpetrators and victims.' 2 Moreover, the adoption of a full-blown
human rights approach makes it look like the ICC is an
international human rights court rather than a criminal court. As
has been repeated several times, however, the Court's function is
not to evaluate and judge general laws and practices of national
courts in the field of criminal justice against the backdrop of
international human rights standards. Its analysis "is not an
assessment of the judicial system as a whole, but an assessment of
whether or not [a state] has investigated or prosecuted, or is
investigating or prosecuting genuinely the case(s) selected by the
Office."'' ° Still, as this article suggests, this task requires a
qualitative assessment in order to protect at least a minimum
provision of respect for persons who are seriously affected.
2. A Reasonable Toleration Approach
A reasonable toleration approach is similar to a substantive
approach in that it recognizes the importance of protecting human
rights."° Yet, unlike the latter, the former is more sensitive of the
limited mandate of the Court and in particular, the many factors
that warrant the partial lacuna in the Statute. One such factor is
the fact that the main concern of the Statute's drafters was to
establish an International Criminal Court to counter situations of
de facto impunity and circumstances of total state failure to
investigate and prosecute massive crimes." Thus, the reasonable
toleration approach does not dwell on the question of the
applicable standards for states that do seek to make an effort to
discharge their duty to exercise criminal jurisdiction. A second
relevant factor is the prevalence of the concern amongst several
delegations involved in the negotiations preceding the adoption of
the Statute over the need to reinforce respect for their sovereign
authority in criminal justice affairs. Those delegations which are
102. For a comprehensive account of these challenges, and how to overcome them, see
U.N. Secretary-General, Rule of Law, supra note 83.
103. Sixth Report of the ICC, supra note 53, 10.
104. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Columbia University Press 1995).
105. See generally Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 22 (1999). The drafters' focus on the jurisdiction of the
Court, rather than on several other issues of central concern for its operation, has been
explained as the result of an assumption that national legislatures were more concerned
with precisely that issue. Id. at 24. Furthermore, the international community had an
interest in considerable state participation "as national systems are expected to maintain
and enforce adherence to international standards." Id. at 25.
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known to be particularly wary of cultural differences, expressed
reservations vis-A-vis the idea of a court with a full blown human
rights mandate." Other delegations, however, asserted that there
was no point in expanding on -human rights, since most states
already conduct their criminal justice affairs in accordance with
them.'" A third and more epistemological factor that may play a
role is the real difficulties surrounding the question of what the
standards actually are, and whether they should be common to all
states and govern all situations. The prevailing disagreement may
not arise solely from states' interests in reinforcing sovereign rule,
but may also stem from a limited understanding of what the
appropriate standards are in the light of cultural diversity or
reasonable pluralism, the need to balance competing claims, and
even the necessity of compromise in the light of the less than ideal
conditions that often face affected states.
The reasonable toleration approach is inspired by, what in
political theoretical studies has come to be defined as, "political
liberalism" or "the law of peoples." This theory recognizes the
need for a common set of principles to govern public affairs in the
field of criminal justice, but does not assume that such principles
should promote a particular state ideal in disregard of non-liberal
"reasonable" accounts of criminal justice. Besides taking seriously
the possibility of state "unwillingness" to conform to an ideal
liberal democratic model of criminal justice, it also houses the
notion of state inability. Furthermore, it stresses that international
legal deliberation, and the appropriate application of principles to
actual situations, is constrained by the "burdens of judgment" or
"a limited understanding. '' "° These burdens explain continued
106. See U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Court, June 15-July 17, 1998, Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and
of the Meetings of the Committee as a Whole, U.N. Doc A/CONF.183/13 vol. II (evidencing
statements made by states during the negotiations in Rome that preceded the adoption of
the Rome Statute, which demonstrate the states' reservations). For example, Cuba stated
its concern that the draft article 15 tended to place too much emphasis on evaluating the
conduct of national courts. Id. at 218. Additionally, Algeria stated that it would be
important to clearly define the principle of complementarity in order to ensure that the
Court would be accepted by the international community. Id. at 219.
107. Id. China declared that the criteria for determining "unwillingness" of a state to
carry out an investigation should be deleted as they were highly subjective and that, in
fact, the judicial systems of most countries were capable of functioning properly. Id. at 218.
108. For a full articulation of the burdens of judgment, see RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 104, at 54-58. For the idea of "limited understanding," see AMY
GUTMAN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 73 (1996).
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good faith moral disagreement on complex matters. They also give
rise to a sense of indeterminacy or inconclusiveness as to what is
the right or acceptable course of action in a particular case, or even
what is considered bad or wrongful.'" The practical implications of
this claim are not clear. While some argue that moral reasoning on
complex matters is best dealt with in courtrooms, others, who take
the fact of good moral disagreement to its more extreme, favor a
democratic and participatory framework involving all the
stakeholders.11
The universalistic aspirations of the Court, the modest
wording in the Statute, and the need for some flexibility on
complex matters, speak in favor of the adoption of the reasonable
toleration approach. Nonetheless, in its acknowledgement of
moral complexity, the need for balancing between competing
claims and sensitivity towards the real difficulties facing affected
states in discharging their duty, this approach risks perpetuating a
sense of indeterminacy or inconclusiveness as to what the
substantive standards to govern this field of national public affairs
should be. Furthermore, in searching for agreement among
reasonable actors, it risks being found all too conservative in its
outlook. The reasonable toleration approach risks becoming too
cautious in its claim about agreeable standards. Moreover, instead
of setting out an extensive list of which human rights matter in a
policy document, it favors an approach where the human rights
question is dealt with, for the most part, on a case-by-case basis. It
thereby risks forfeiting the main purpose for which there is a need
for a more substantive approach to the relationship between
complementarity and human rights in the first place. It does not
facilitate a full clarification a priori of which human rights deserve
full respect, and what states are required to do and not to do in
order to conform to them.
Even so, it can be considered a "human rights engaged"
approach in the sense that it does not seek to avoid an assessment
of human rights compliance altogether. Rather, it is fully
committed to considering whether affected states conform to these
rights and to defining their meaning in the light of its mandate and
of international human rights law. This approach's commitment
109. For a discussion of inconclusiveness as opposed to indeterminacy, see GERALD F.
GAUS, JUSTIFICATORY LIBERALISM. AN ESSAY ON EPISTEMOLOGY AND POLITICAL
THEORY 154 (1996).
110. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
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would be limited to assessing the notion of due process as
recognized in international law (as recognized in the Statute).
Nevertheless, the reasonable toleration approach could serve as a
starting point for extending this notion and incorporating fair trial
guarantees. Additionally, it could form the basis for discussing the
role and interests of other participants in criminal proceedings,
including witnesses and victims. In adopting this approach, the
Court could make full use of its limited human rights mandate.
Specifically, it could work towards minimizing the potential moral
costs of extensive national judicial engagement, and towards the
creation and implementation of common laws to govern the
delivery of international justice in situations of massive crime.

